Magic of Statistics for Software Testing: How to Foresee the Unseen


Seongmin Lee Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP)

25.04.28 | SBFT'25






Vulnerability



Program




Fuzzer (Input generator) **Vulnerability**




Program

Inputs





Fuzzer (Input generator)




Vulnerability








american fuzzy lop 2.02b (fu	uzzer01)
- process timing	overall results
run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 17 min, 43 sec	cycles done : 0
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 0 sec	total paths : 1576
last unig crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 18 sec	unig crashes : 595
last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec	uniq hangs : 103
- cycle progress map cover	
	sity : 14.6k (22.22%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%) count cove	erage : 2.60 bits/tuple
- stage progress	
	aths : 1 (0.06%)
그는 것이 같은 것이 같이 많이 많이 많이 없다. 것이 같은 것이 많이	s on : 1007 (63.90%)
	shes : 43.5k (595 unique)
exec speed : 265.2/sec total ha	angs : 1736 (103 unique)
⊢ fuzzing strategy yields	path geometry
bit flips : 755/10.5k, 260/10.5k, 177/10.5k	levels : 2
byte flips : 16/1309, 10/1308, 7/1306	pending : 1576
arithmetics : 835/73.2k, 54/53.9k, 18/27.8k	pend fav : 1
known ints : 35/5108, 0/0, 0/0	own finds : 1575
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0	imported : 0
havoc : 0/0, 0/0	variable : 0
trim : 0.00%/641, 0.00%	
	[cpu: 62%]
	Lebut one



Software Testing — Test by Actual Running




Crash!



american fuzzy lop 2.02b (fuzzer01)

- process timing	overall results
run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 17 min, 43 sec	cycles done : 0
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 0 sec	total paths : 1576
last unig crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 18 sec	unig crashes : 595
last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec	unig hangs : 103
- cycle progress map coverag	
	ty : 14.6k (22.22%)
그렇는 그 것 옷에서 그 방법에 가장 옷에 가지 못 하는 것 같아? 아이들 것 같아? 아이들 것 같아? 아이들 것 같아? 가 있는 것 같아? ??????????	ge : 2.60 bits/tuple
- stage progress	
now trying : interest 16/8 favored path	
그는 말 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같이 못 못했다. 것 같은 것 같	n : 1007 (63.90%)
	5 : 43.5k (595 unique)
	5 : 1736 (103 unique)
— fuzzing strategy yields —	path geometry
bit flips : 755/10.5k, 260/10.5k, 177/10.5k	l levels : 2
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arithmetics : 835/73.2k, 54/53.9k, 18/27.8k	pend fav : 1
known ints : 35/5108, 0/0, 0/0	own finds : 1575
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0	imported : 0
havoc : 0/0, 0/0	variable : 0
trim : 0.00%/641, 0.00%	
	[cpu: 62%]


As a fuzzing campaign progresses,



Program



As a fuzzing campaign progresses,




Coverage Increase (lines or basic blocks)



Program

As a fuzzing campaign progresses,




Coverage Increase (lines or basic blocks)



Program


Q. So, Has this program been completely tested?



Coverage Increase (lines or basic blocks)

Program

Q. So, Has this program been completely tested? A. No



Coverage Increase (lines or basic blocks)

Program

Q. So, Has this program been completely tested? A. No



Coverage Increase (lines or basic blocks)

Unseen Behavior

i.e., based on program executions




The Fundamental Problem of Software Testing

"It is always incomplete."

The Fundamental Problem of Software Testing

"There is always unseen."

In this talk,






Given only the current status/result of the software testing, we want to know

"How secure is this program?"

Let's think about




Q. What kind of questions would help us to know how much the program has been tested with software testing?

*Red : semantic meaning *Black : concrete task



*Red : semantic meaning *Black : concrete task








*Red : semantic meaning *Black : concrete task

How many unobserved vulnerabilities are remaining?

What is the maximum coverage we can achieve?






*Red : semantic meaning *Black : concrete task

How many unobserved vulnerabilities are remaining?

What is the maximum coverage we can achieve?





How can we answer questions about the unseen?






How can we answer questions about the unseen?







Ecology



Social Science

Free image by d_alexander33 and andibreit from pixabay



Free image by TheOtherKev and Efraimstochter from pixabay and By Calvin Teo. - Own work., CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1054067



Free image by TheOtherKev and Efraimstochter from pixabay and By Calvin Teo. - Own work., CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1054067







```
def f(x0, x1) {
    if (x0 + 5*x1 - 9 < 0) return;
    if (x0 + x1 -5 > 0) return;
    if (-x0 + 3x1 - 7 > 0) return;
    if (x0 > 0) return;
    assert False
}
f(input() % 5, input() % 5)
```


183 184 185 186 187	<pre>user_id = document var phone = document. var username = docume var password = docume var cpassword = docume var firstname=document.ge</pre>
188	var firstname=document.ge
168	<pre>var firstname=document.ge){</pre>
189	var firstname=document.ge
190	var firstname=document.g
191	var firstname=document.(
192	var firstname=document.(
193	var firstname=document.(
194	<pre>var firstname=document.g var firstname=document.g (!@#\$%^&*()*+=~`) No (!@#\$%^&*()*+=~`)</pre>
195	<pre>(!@#\$%^&*()# var firstname=document.g var firstname=document.g var firstname=document.g</pre>
196	<pre>var firstname=document()</pre>
197 198	

C.gettile C. getElenerthelen ent getElement etElementByIst etElementByIst etElementByIst etElementById("frame"); (in etElementById("from "is film getElementBy20[*tmm*12 ()*****) Not allower all THE COMPANY OF THE PARTY OF THE

182	User id
4.003	<pre>var user_id = document.getElevel var username = document.getElevel</pre>
184	Vor Username
185	Var password
	Var Chassword
186	
188	var firstname=document.getElementByLc(/team
){
189	var firstname=document.getElementBy16(*frame);#lements
190	var firstname=document.getElementby14('tame) #
191	<pre>var firstname=document.('');#f(isComptric)</pre>
192	war firstname=document.
193	<pre>var firstname=document.('');#(istance) var firstname=document.getElement#/('fame istance) var firstname=document.getElement#//('fame istance))</pre>
194	firstname-docta an Net allowed
	(10#\$%^&*()***
195	11 St. 110#\$% 0*1
196	<pre>var firstname=document.getCline=') Not allae var firstname=document.getCline=') Not allae password (!@#\$%^&*()*+=') Not allae firstname=document.getCline=') Not allae var firstname=document.getCline=') Not allae firstname=document.getCline=') Not allae firstname=document.getCline='') Not allae firstname=document.getCline='') Not allae firstname=document.getCline=''') Not allae firstname=document.getCline=''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''</pre>
and the second	firsting documents
197	firstname (10#\$% Set)
198	<pre>Var Password (:ext firstname=document.getE) var firstname=document.getE username(!@#\$%^&*()*****) Net username=document.getE username=document.getE</pre>








Program

Software Testing \Rightarrow Sampling Process

(92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,301,302,303,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,109,110,134,...) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,109,135,136,137,...) (92,93,17,18) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,301,305,306,...)

Coverage (Line numbers)



Program


Software Testing \Rightarrow Sampling Process

* Abundantly observed coverage

(92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,301,302,303,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,109,110,134,...) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,109,135,136,137,...) (92,93,17,18) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,301,305,306,...)

Coverage (Line numbers)





Program


Software Testing \Rightarrow Sampling Process

* Abundantly observed coverage * Rarely observed coverage

(92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,301,302,303,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,109,110,134,...) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,109,135,136,137,...) (92,93,17,18) (92,93,352,353,354,...) (92,93,355,356,357,...) (92,93,301,305,306,...)


Coverage (Line numbers)






Program

Software Testing \Rightarrow Sampling Process




Colored Balls



Urn of Balls


Illustration by Quartl; CC-BY-SA 3.0

Software Testing \Rightarrow Sampling Process




Colored Balls

Unseen execution




Urn of Balls




Colored Balls

Unseen execution




Urn of Balls




Colored Balls


Unseen execution



Residual Risk of Testing \approx **Remaining Unseen Colors**



Questions about the unseen in Software Testing




What is the maximum coverage we can achieve?



Questions about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls


What is the maximum coverage we can achieve?





Questions about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls


How many colors are remaining in the urn?






Questions about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

How many colors are remaining in the urn?





Questions about the unseen in an



How many colors are remaining in the urn?

What is the **probability** of observing a new color ball in the next sample?


Statistics. How many new colors can I see more if

I sample X more balls from the urn?



Statistical notion of the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

How many colors are remaining in the urn?






Statistical notion of the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

Species Richness

How many colors are remaining in the urn?






Statistical notion of the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

Species Richness

How many colors are remaining in the urn?






Estimators about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

Species Richness


How many colors are remaining in the urn?





Estimators about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls


Species Richness $\frac{n-1}{n} \frac{(\Phi_1)^2}{2\Phi_2}$





Estimators about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

Species Richness $\frac{n-1}{n} \frac{(\Phi_1)^2}{2\Phi_2}$







Check how the statistical estimator can measure the unseen in software testing.

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing *a new coverage or a new bug*?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve *if I spend X more time* here?



Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing a new coverage or a new bug?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here? advanced extensions statistical methods realistic testing scenarios.





Check how the statistical estimator can measure the unseen in software testing.

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing *a new coverage or a new bug*?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve *if I spend X more time* here?



Hands-on-exercise with **Fuzzing Book**


The Fuzzing Book

Tools and Techniques for Generating Software Tests

by Andreas Zeller, Rahul Gopinath, Marcel Böhme, Gordon Fraser, and Christian Holler

About this Book

Welcome to "The Fuzzing Book"! Software has bugs, and catching bugs can involve lots of effort. This book addresses this problem by *automating* software testing, specifically by *generating tests automatically*. Recent years have seen the development of novel techniques that lead to dramatic improvements in test generation and software testing. They now are mature enough to be assembled in a book – even with executable code.




A Textbook for Paper, Screen, and Keyboard


You can use this book in four ways:

- You can read chapters in your browser. Check out the list of chapters in the menu above, or start right away with the introduction to testing or the introduction to fuzzing. All code is available for download.
- You can interact with chapters as Jupyter Notebooks (beta). This allows you to edit and extend the code, experimenting *live in your browser*. Simply select "Resources → Edit as Notebook" at the top of each chapter. <u>Try interacting with the introduction to fuzzing.</u>
- You can use the code in your own projects. You can download the code as Python programs; simply select "Resources → Download Code" for one chapter or "Resources → All Code" for all chapters. These code files can be executed, yielding (hopefully) the same results as the notebooks. Even easier: Install the fuzzingbook Python package.
- You can present chapters as slides. This allows for presenting the material in lectures. Just select "Resources
 → View slides" at the top of each chapter. <u>Try viewing the slides for the introduction to fuzzing.</u>



O. Preparation





To the notebook.



Check how the statistical estimator can measure the unseen in software testing.

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing a new coverage or a new bug?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?






Missing Mass

What is the probability of observing a new coverage or a new bug? a new color ball?

Solution:







$\hat{M}_0 =$ n

The estimation of the probability of our following sample is something that has never been seen before.








The estimation of the probability of our following sample is something that has never been seen before.



Alan Turing







The estimation of the probability of our following sample is something that has never been seen before.

To the notebook.


Good-Turing estimator $\hat{M}_0 = \frac{\Phi_1}{n}$

Good-Turing estimator $\hat{M}_0 = \frac{\Phi_1}{n}$

is able to estimate the missing mass.

Good-Turing estimator \hat{M}_0 = n

is able to estimate the missing mass. \Leftrightarrow the probability of our next sample being a new color.




\hat{M}_{f} **Good-Turing estimator** N

is able to estimate the missing mass. \Leftrightarrow the probability of our next sample being a new color. \Leftrightarrow the probability of the next input generating a new coverage.



How can the Good-Turing estimator estimate missing mass?

n




colors only seen once in samples

of *singleton colors

of samples



How can the Good-Turing estimator estimate missing mass?



probability of seeing a singleton event."

colors only seen once in samples


of *singleton colors

of samples n

What it implies: "The probability of seeing an unseen event in the next sample is close to the



How can the Good-Turing estimator estimate missing mass?



probability of seeing a singleton event."

Loose explanation: "Because if we observe the unseen event, it becomes the singleton event."

colors only seen once in samples $\hat{M}_0 = \Phi_1$ # of *singleton colors # of samples n


What it implies: "The probability of seeing an unseen event in the next sample is close to the



A little bit more mathematics...

- Let's say there is an urn filled with colored balls.
 - The probability of picking the ball of color $i = p_i$, $p_1 + p_2 \dots + p_s = 1$
- Let's say we picked *n* balls from the urn.
- [# of **Singleton**] number of colors with only one ball in the sample

$$\Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if there's one ball with of otherwise} \\ \text{[Missing Mass] The probability of observing one of the unset
$$\sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}, p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ otherwise} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ is unobserving one of the unset} \\ \Phi_{1} = \sum_{i=1}^{S} (p_{i}) \text{ color } i \text{ color$$$$



ore,

 $\mathbb{E}\left[M_0\right] \approx \frac{1}{n} \Rightarrow \frac{1}{n} \text{ as an estimator for the missing mass } M_0.$

	0	

STADS: Software Testing as Species Discovery

Spatial and Temporal Extrapolation from Tested Program Behaviors

MARCEL BOHME^{*}, National University of Singapore and Monash University, Australia

A fundamental challenge of software testing is the statistically well-grounded *extrapolation* from program behaviors observed during testing. For instance, a security researcher who has run the fuzzer for a week has currently *no* means (i) to estimate the total number of *feasible* program branches, given that only a fraction has been covered so far, (ii) to estimate the additional time required to cover 10% more branches (or to estimate the coverage achieved in one more day, resp.), or (iii) to assess the residual risk that a vulnerability exists when no vulnerability has been discovered. Failing to discover a vulnerability, does not mean that none exists-even if the fuzzer was run for a week (or a year). Hence, testing provides no formal correctness guarantees.

In this article, I establish an unexpected connection with the otherwise unrelated scientific field of *ecology*, and introduce a statistical framework that models Software Testing and Analysis as Discovery of Species (STADS). For instance, in order to study the species diversity of arthropods in a tropical rain forest, ecologists would first sample a large number of individuals from that forest, determine their species, and extrapolate from the properties observed in the sample to properties of the whole forest. The estimation (i) of the total number of species, (ii) of the additional sampling effort required to discover 10% more species, or (iii) of the probability to discover a new species are classical problems in ecology. The STADS framework draws from over three decades of research in ecological biostatistics to address the fundamental extrapolation challenge for automated test generation. Our preliminary empirical study demonstrates a good estimator performance even for a fuzzer with adaptive sampling bias-AFL, a state-of-the-art vulnerability detection tool. The STADS framework provides *statistical correctness guarantees* with quantifiable accuracy.

 \bullet

- Estimating residual risk in greybox fuzzing. Marcel Böhme, Danushka Liyanage, and Valentin Wüstholz. ESEC/FSE 2021
 - Apply residual risk analysis on Greybox fuzzing

• STADS: Software Testing as Species Discovery. Marcel Böhme. TOSEM 2018.

Foundational work that interprets the software testing process as a statistical sampling process



Estimating Residual Risk in Greybox Fuzzing

Marcel Böhme Monash University, Australia MPI-SP, Germany

Danushka Liyanage Monash University Australia

Valentin Wüstholz ConsenSys Germany




For any errorless fuzzing campaign, no matter how long, there is always some residual risk that a software error would be discovered if only the campaign was run for just a bit longer. Recently, greybox fuzzing tools have found widespread adoption. Yet, practitioners can only guess when the residual risk of a greybox fuzzing campaign falls below a specific, maximum allowable threshold.

In this paper, we explain why residual risk cannot be directly estimated for greybox campaigns, argue that the discovery probability (i.e., the probability that the next generated input increases code coverage) provides an excellent upper bound, and explore sound statistical methods to estimate the discovery probability in an ongoing greybox campaign. We find that estimators for blackbox fuzzing systematically and substantially under-estimate the true risk. An engineer—who stops the campaign when the estimators purport a risk below the maximum allowable risk-is vastly misled. She might need execute a campaign that is orders of magnitude longer to achieve the allowable risk. Hence, the key challenge we address in this paper is *adaptive bias*: The probability to discover a specific error actually increases over time. We provide the first probabilistic analysis of adaptive bias, and introduce two novel classes of estimators that tackle adaptive bias. With our estimators, the engineer can decide with confidence when to abort the campaign.

CCS CONCEPTS

Security and privacy → Software and application security;



factor --- Discovery probability ---- Bug Probabi

Figure 1: In greybox fuzzing, the probability p_{hug} to generate a bug-revealing input (dashed line) *increases* as *n* increases. The probability $\Delta(n)$ that the (n+1)-th input is coverageincreasing (solid line) provides an upper bound on the probability (residual risk) that it is the *first* bug-revealing input. The vertical line is when we expect the first bug-rev. input.

correctness of the program only for some inputs. While verification provides much stronger correctness guarantees, it is greybox fuzzing, a specific form of software testing, which has found widespread adoption in industry [24–26].

From a fuzzing campaign that has found no bugs, can we derive some statement about the correctness of the program? Fuzzing being a random process, it should be possible to derive statistical me about the probability that the part concreted input is the



Check how the statistical estimator can measure the unseen in software testing.

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing *a new coverage or a new bug*?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?



Extrapolation


How much more coverage can I get How many more colors

How much more coverage can I get if I fuzz the program with X more inputs?



Anne Chao and Lou Jost. 2012. Coverage-based rarefaction and extrapolation: standardizing samples by completeness rather than size. Ecology 93

 Φ_1 : the number of singletons








$$\hat{\Delta}(m) = \hat{\Phi}_0 \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ - \\ n \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\hat{\Phi}_0: \text{ the estimated number} \\ \text{ of remaining unseen} \\ \frac{n-1}{n} \frac{(\Phi_1)^2}{2\Phi_2}$$


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


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
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
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






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










To the notebook.




It is able to extrapolate how many new colors we will observe more when we have *m* more samples.





It is able to extrapolate how many new colors we will observe more when we have *m* more samples.






\Leftrightarrow extrapolate the coverage increase when we run the fuzzing longer.



(92,93,109,135,136,137,...)

(92,93,17,18)

(92,93,352,353,354,...)



(92,93,109,135,136,137,...)

(92,93,17,18)

(92,93,352,353,354,...)





92, 93, 109, ... Each line

(92,93,109,135,136,137,...)

(92,93,17,18)

(92,93,352,353,354,...)





92, 93, 109, ... Each line

Color of a ball



bb#1, bb#2, bb#42, ... Each basic block

(92,93,109,135,136,137,...)

(92,93,17,18)

(92,93,352,353,354,...)





92, 93, 109, ... Each line

$$\langle s_{@12} = T \wedge s_{@3} = F \rangle,$$
$$\langle s_{@12} = F \wedge s_{@3} = F \rangle,$$

Each program state

• • •

Color of a ball



bb#1, bb#2, bb#42, ... Each basic block

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 $CCS \ Concepts: \bullet \ Security \ and \ privacy \rightarrow Penetration \ testing; \bullet \ Software \ and \ its \ engineering \rightarrow Software \ testing \ and \ debugging;$

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Statistical guarantees, extrapolation, fuzzing, stopping rule, code coverage, species coverage, discovery probability, security, reliability, measure of confidence, measure of progress

ACM Reference format:

Marcel Böhme. 2018. STADS: Software Testing as Species Discovery. *ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.* 0, 0, Article 0 (April 2018), 52 pages. https://doi.org/0000001.0000001

1 INTRODUCTION

The development of automated and practical approaches to vulnerability detection has never been more important. The recent world-wide WannaCry cyber-epidemic clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of our well-connected software systems. WannaCry exploits a *software vulnerability* on Windows machines to gain root access on a huge number of computers all over the world. The

*Dr. Böhme conducted this research at the National University of Singapore and has since moved to Monash University.

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
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ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: April 2018.

• STADS: Software Testing as Species Discovery. Marcel Böhme. TOSEM 2018.

 \bullet

Foundational work that interprets the software testing process as a statistical sampling process



Questions?

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing a new coverage or a new bug?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here? advanced extensions statistical methods realistic testing scenarios.




 $\hat{M}_0 = \frac{\Phi_1}{n}$

Good-Turing estimator

$$\hat{\Delta}(m) = \hat{\Phi}_0 \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_1}{n\hat{\Phi}_0 + \Phi_1} \right)^m \right]$$

Extrapolator



Good-Turing estimator

Depending on the problem one wants to solve, the **statistical estimator may not be directly applicable**.

$$\hat{\mathbf{A}}(m) = \hat{\Phi}_0 \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_1}{n\hat{\Phi}_0 + \Phi_1} \right)^m \right]$$

Extrapolator


Missing Mass


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






"What is the probability of reaching s?"

Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)




A *program state* is a property one is interested in that is either reached or unreached, given the program execution.

Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA) measures the probability of how likely a certain program state is reached given the workload of the program.


$$Pr(s) = \sum_{e \in E} Pr(e) \cdot \mathbf{1}(s \text{ is reached by } e)$$
$$E: workload \text{ or } execution profile}$$

— For *seen* program states, —


- For *seen* program states, -



Samples of inputs from the operational distribution (workload)



- For *seen* program states, -




- For *seen* program states, -

$X_{\rm s}$:= the number of **O** in *n* samples $\hat{\Pr}(s) = \frac{X_s}{s} \xrightarrow{n \to \infty} \Pr(s)$ n

Empirical Probability

Challenge: Missing Rare Program States




If the state s is rarely observable, i.e., $Pr(s) \approx 0$,

$$X_s = 0 = 0$$

If it is unobserved, the empirical probability underapproximates to zero probability.

Challenge: Missing Rare Program States



Problem of unseen events / Sunrise problem

If the state s is rarely observable, i.e., $Pr(s) \approx 0$,

$$X_s = 0 = 0$$

If it is unobserved, the empirical probability underapproximates to zero probability.

"Wait... don't we already know how to do that?"

"Wait... don't we already know how to do that?"

Solution:

Good-Turing estimator




Alan Turing




The estimation of the probability of our following sample is something that has never been seen before.

— The estimator for the probability of an unseen event happening —



Problem

Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)



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
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E: workload or execution profile

122

Problem

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
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
Previous solution





Problem

Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)



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
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Previous solution




We want the probability of seeing THE unseen state, not AN unseen state. (specific) (any)



Problem

Quantitative Reachability Analysis (QRA)



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
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122

Blackbox Estimator




We want the probability of seeing THE unseen state, not AN unseen state. (specific) (any)





Blackbox estimators cannot distinguish between unseen states.






 $\Pr(s_1) \ge \Pr(s_2);$ However $\hat{\Pr}_{BB}(s_1, O) = \hat{\Pr}_{BB}(s_2, O)$, given the sample O.

Blackbox estimators cannot distinguish between unseen states.






 $\Pr(s_1) \ge \Pr(s_2);$ However $\hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_1, O) = \hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_2, O)$, given the sample O.

unseen states.

 s_2 has larger chances of being reached than s_4








However $\hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_1, O) = \hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_2, O)$, given the sample O.

unseen states.

 s_2 has larger chances of being reached than s_4








However $\hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_1, O) = \hat{\Pr}_{RR}(s_2, O)$, given the sample O.

unseen states.

 s_2 has larger chances of being reached than s_4







However $\hat{\Pr}_{BB}(s_1, O) = \hat{\Pr}_{BB}(s_2, O)$, given the sample O.

unseen states.

 s_2 has larger chances of being reached than s_4

Black-box estimators are entirely unaware of the structural feature of the program.







Approach: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states. •




Approach: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states. •




Approach: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states.




Approach: reflect the (control) dependence relation between the program states. lacksquare





Approach: reflect the (control) dependence relation between the program states. lacksquare





```
Pr(Pred→Next)
```















Evaluation

RQ 2. Blackbox estimator vs. Structure-aware estimator

- Subjects: 5 Subjects from Siemens suite
 + 5 Open-source C libraries
- Target state: hard-to-be-covered basic
- Evaluation setting:




e	Program	NCLOC	# Func	# BB	GT
	tcas	146	9	63	5.37E-04
	schedule2	332	17	138	3.99E-04
c block	totinfo	349	7	132	9.2E-04
	printtokens2	438	19	198	7.82E-03
	replace	534	21	228	2.73E-04
	gif2png*	988	27	700	2.95E-04
	jsoncpp	7,251	1,328	5,938	2.28E-03
	jasper*	17,385	720	14,417	2.48E-04
	readelf	22,347	477	18,578	1.99E-07
	freetype2	44,686	1,635	27,521	8.25E-08
			1		


Expected number of samples needed to reach

UI

Blackbox Estimator vs Structure-aware Estimator



3 Individual 2 cases



• The *structure-aware estimator* performed significantly better than the blackbox estimators.

Blackbox **Structure**

Sample size	Laplace	Good-Turing	Struct
10 %	1.28	2.41	0.91
0.01%	3.00	4.67	1.77







Statistical Reachability Analysis

Seongmin Lee Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy Bochum, Germany seongmin.lee@mpi-sp.org Marcel Böhme Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy Bochum, Germany marcel.boehme@acm.org

ABSTRACT

Given a target program state (or statement) *s*, what is the probability that an input reaches *s*? This is the quantitative reachability analysis problem. For instance, quantitative reachability analysis can be used to approximate the reliability of a program (where *s* is a bad state). Traditionally, quantitative reachability analysis is solved as a model counting problem for a formal constraint that represents the (approximate) reachability of *s* along paths in the program, i.e., probabilistic reachability analysis. However, in preliminary experiments, we failed to run state-of-the-art probabilistic reachability analysis on reasonably large programs.

In this paper, we explore statistical methods to estimate reachability probability. An advantage of statistical reasoning is that the size and composition of the program are insubstantial as long as the program can be executed. We are particularly interested in the error compared to the state-of-the-art probabilistic reachability analysis. We realize that existing estimators do not exploit the inherent structure of the program and develop structure-aware estimators to further reduce the estimation error given the same number of samples. Our empirical evaluation on previous and new benchmark programs shows that (i) our statistical reachability analysis outperforms state-of-the-art probabilistic reachability analysis tools in terms of accuracy, efficiency, and scalability, and (ii) our structure-aware estimators further outperform (blackbox) estimators that do not exploit the inherent program structure. We also identify multiple program properties that limit the applicability of the existing probabilistic analysis techniques.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Theory of computation → Program analysis; • Mathematics of computing → Bayesian computation.

KEYWORDS

Quantitative reachability analysis, Statistical reachability analysis, Reaching probability, Markov chain

ACM Reference Format:

Seongmin Lee and Marcel Böhme. 2023. Statistical Reachability Analysis. In Proceedings of the 31st ACM Joint European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE '23), December 3–9, 2023, San Francisco, CA, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 12 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3611643.3616268

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ESEC/FSE '23, December 3–9, 2023, San Francisco, CA, USA © 2023 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 979-8-4007-0327-0/23/12. https://doi.org/10.1145/3611643.3616268

1 INTRODUCTION

The traditional assessment of the reachability of a program state provides only a true-false answer: either the state is reachable (e.g., the program may crash for some input) or not (e.g., it never crashes for any input). Due to the undecidability of the analysis problem [16] and the restricted expressiveness of the analysis result, such a binary answer provides only limited information. Instead of a binary answer, *quantitative reachability analysis* provides the probability of how likely a certain program state is reached given the workload of the program. Such a *quantitative* measure of reachability can provide more comprehensive information about the program semantics. For instance, it can estimate how probable is to reach a crashing state under normal workload, which can be critical information for software reliability/security/maintenance.

The typical method considered for quantitative reachability analysis is called *probabilistic reachability analysis* [27], which *analytically computes* the reaching probability directly from the source code. Probabilistic Symbolic Execution (PSE), the pioneering work by Geldenhuys et al. [12], computes the reaching probability of a program state by finding all the path conditions to reach the state using symbolic execution and counting the number of inputs satisfying the path conditions using model counting; the sum of the probabilities becomes the exact reaching probability of the program state. As PSE may suffer from scalability issues for a large and complex program, many follow-up works have been proposed to improve the scalability of probabilistic reachability analysis [11, 13]. Most recently, Saha et al. proposed PReach which computes the reaching probability using branch-level probability information [27].

When facing a problem too complex for the analytical method, especially when it is unmanageable to compute a quantity exactly, a sampling-based statistical method can be used to overcome the limitation [4]. It is well-known that Monte Carlo methods have been successfully applied to numerous problems across various fields, including natural sciences [10] and engineering [23], where the solution is intractable for analytic computation. Recently, in the context of program analysis, Liyanage et al. [21] proposed a statistical method to approximate the number of elements that can be reached by actual program execution, which, previously, can only be upper-bounded by static analysis.

 \bullet

This work explores how the statistical method can be applied to quantitative reachability analysis. We propose a *statistical reachability analysis*, which tackles the quantitative reachability analysis problem with random sampling and statistical modeling. The main issue of statistical reachability analysis is how to estimate the reaching probability of a certain program state that has not yet been observed in the sampling process. To overcome this issue, we first suggest a naive approach of using two well-known estimators, Laplace smoothing and Good-Turing estimator [15], that can estimate the non-zero probability of unseen events from the

• Statistical Reachability Analysis. Seongmin Lee and Marcel Böhme. ESEC/FSE 2023.

By integrating lightweight structural information, statistical reaching probability estimation becomes *more grounded*, being able to *distinguish the reaching probability of unreached program states*.

Missing Mass


What is the **probability** of observing a new coverage or a new bug?

Extrapolation


How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here? advanced extensions statistical methods realistic testing scenarios.



Statistically Extrapolating the Fuzzing Campaign



Anne Chao and Robert K Colwell. 2017. Thirty years of progeny from Chao's inequality: Estimating and comparing richness with incidence data and incomplete sampling. SORT 41 Anne Chao and Lou Jost. 2012. Coverage-based rarefaction and extrapolation: standardizing samples by completeness rather than size. Ecology 93



Statistically Extrapolating the Fuzzing Campaign

Without Extrapolation

american fuzzy lop 2.44b (djpeg)			
run time : 0 days, 12 hrs, 0 min, 5 sec last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 17 min, 44 sec	•		
last uniq crash : none seen yet	uniq crashes : 0		

12 hours of running, the last new path was 17 minutes ago. ... should I stop this fuzzing?

Extrapolation gives richer information for the stopping criteria for the fuzzing campaign

With Extrapolation

extrapolation	edition	veah!	(dineg)
CALIMPOTATION	CULCION	yean.	(UJPCS)

residual risk : 7·10^-06	total inputs :	63.6M	
path coverage : 77.6% paths covered =			
discover new path : 0 hrs, 1 min, 36 sec	doubletons	70	
<pre>142k new inputs needed</pre>			
		70	




A new path will come in 2 minutes? Let's keep going!

extrapolation edition yeah!	(djpeg)	
residual risk : 8.10^-07 path coverage : 07.9% paths covered discover new path : 0 hrs, 15 min, 9 sec 1.3M new inputs needed	doubletons : 42	Ī

1/4 hour is needed for the next path? Let's stop!

However, there is a hidden assumption:



Anne Chao and Robert K Colwell. 2017. Thirty years of progeny from Chao's inequality: Estimating and comparing richness with incidence data and incomplete sampling. SORT 41 Anne Chao and Lou Jost. 2012. Coverage-based rarefaction and extrapolation: standardizing samples by completeness rather than size. Ecology 93




However, there is a hidden assumption:


Let's say there is an urn filled with colored balls. The probability of picking the ball of color $i = p_i$. Let's say we picked *n* balls from the urn.

Assumption: "The sampling distribution does not change."












Greybox Fuzzing: distribution *changes* **as time goes on**




:= Adaptive bias Greybox Fuzzing: distribution *changes* as time goes on







Sampling distribution is consistent




Sampling distribution keeps change



Sampling distribution is consistent




Sampling distribution keeps change



distribution is consistent


distribution keeps change





distribution is consistent

distribution keeps change



The estimators for the blackbox fuzzing will underestimate the performance of the greybox fuzzing.


keeps change

Extrapolating the Greybox Fuzzing Campaign


• Aim: Predict the future coverage rate of the greybox fuzzing campaign

Extrapolating the Greybox Fuzzing Campaign


- Aim: Predict the future coverage rate of the greybox fuzzing campaign
- In other words, how can we solve the *adaptive bias* problem?



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


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- In other words, how can we solve the *adaptive bias* problem?




• First key insight — *Microscopic view*

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


• First key insight – *Microscopic view*






• First key insight – *Microscopic view*









• First key insight — *Microscopic view*



- First key insight *Microscopic view*
- Potential drawback: Small region has small data to use





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


Skewed (selection bias) coverage record

- First key insight *Microscopic view*
- Solution: *Shuffle to amplify*








1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
•••		•••	•••	•••
1	0	1	1	1

1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
•••	•••			•••
1	1	1	0	1


1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1
1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0
	•••		
0	1	1	1
1 Ø 	- 1 0 	1 0 	1


Skewed (selection bias) coverage record

Amplifying blackbox fuzzing - Blackbox Approximation-




- First key insight *Microscopic view*
- Solution: *Shuffle to amplify*





	1	1	1	1	1
	1	0	0	0	0
	0	0	1	1	1
	0	0	1	1	0
	0	0	1	1	0
	1	1	1	1	1
	0	0	0	0	0
	•••	•••	•••	•••	
	1	1	1	1	0




1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
•••		•••	•••	
1	0	1	1	1

1	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
•••	•••	•••		•••
1	1	1	0	1


1	1	1	1
0	0	0	1
1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1
0	0	0	0
•••	•••	•••	
0	1	1	1
	0 1 0 1 0 	0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Skewed (selection bias) coverage record

Amplifying blackbox fuzzing - Blackbox Approximation-



- First key insight *Microscopic view*
- Solution: *Shuffle to amplify*



• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*


"Greybox fuzzing's adaptive bias could be predictable."

• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*


"Greybox fuzzing's adaptive bias could be predictable."

• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*

"Greybox fuzzing's adaptive bias could be predictable."




• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*




• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*

"Greybox fuzzing's adaptive bias could be predictable." — There's a pattern!




- New input that *increases coverage* is found.

• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*




- New input that *increases coverage* is found.
- Inputs around the new input are sampled.

• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*




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
• Second key insight — *Macroscopic view*




- New input that *increases coverage* is found.
- Inputs around the new input are sampled.
- Changing the focus (distribution) increases the chance of covering a new part of the program.




Coverage Increase Plot of the Greybox Fuzzing



Coverage Increase Plot of the Greybox Fuzzing



Coverage Increase Plot of the Greybox Fuzzing



Regression Model






Ξ	
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
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		t_0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	•••	1
2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	•••	0
3	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	•••	0
4	0	0	0		1	0	1	•••	1
5	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	•••	0
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	•••	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•••	0
•••	•••	••••		•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••
S	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	•••	0





Sub-campaign






Sub-campaign

Blackbox-ize








Sub-campaign

Blackbox-ize



Singletons & Doubletons




Greybox coverage record

Sub-campaign


Blackbox-ize


Doubletons











the existing blackbox extrapolation model?


Existing $\hat{U}(t+k)$

Extrapolator

$$\hat{\Phi}_0 \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_1}{t\hat{\Phi}_0 + \Phi_1} \right)^k \right]$$

Ignores the adaptive bias

Q. How accurate is our *regression model considering the adaptive bias* compared to






- the existing blackbox extrapolation model?
 - Subject program: five open-source C libraries \bullet
 - **Evaluation Scenario**: \bullet

Existing
$$\hat{U}(t+k)$$

Extrapolator
 $\hat{\Phi}_0 \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_1}{t\hat{\Phi}_0 + \Phi_1} \right)^k \right]$

Ignores the adaptive bias

Q. How accurate is our *regression model considering the adaptive bias* compared to





the existing blackbox extrapolation model?


- Subject program: five open-source C libraries
- Evaluation Scenario: 1) run the greybox fuzzer until having t data points ullet
 - 2) apply each extrapolator to extrapolate $\hat{U}(t + k)$
 - 3) run the greybox fuzzer for k more data points to get U(t + k).

Existing
$$\hat{U}(t+k)$$

Extrapolator
 $\hat{\Phi}_{0} \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_{1}}{t\hat{\Phi}_{0} + \Phi_{1}} \right)^{k} \right]$

Ignores the adaptive bias

Q. How accurate is our *regression model considering the adaptive bias* compared to





the existing blackbox extrapolation model?

- Subject program: five open-source C libraries
- Evaluation Scenario: 1) run the greybox fuzzer until having t data points \bullet 2) apply each extrapolator to extrapolate $\hat{U}(t+k)$ Compare


 - 3) run the greybox fuzzer for k more data points to get U(t + k).

Existing
$$\hat{U}(t+k)$$

Extrapolator
 $\hat{\Phi}_{0} \left[1 - \left(1 - \frac{\Phi_{1}}{t\hat{\Phi}_{0} + \Phi_{1}} \right)^{k} \right]$

Ignores the adaptive bias

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


VS



Evaluation: Coverage Rate Prediction

Difference between $\log(U(t+k))$ vs. $\log(\hat{U}(t+k))$



"Our extrapolator exhibits at least one order of magnitude lower absolute bias than the existing extrapolator for 4 out of 5 subjects, especially for long-term prediction."


➡ Chao and Jost approach ➡ Our approach

(close to 1 is better) The average ratio $U(t + k)/\hat{U}(t + k)$: [Ours] **1.17 - 7** [Existing] **1.6 - 800** across all subjects.



Evaluation: Coverage Rate Prediction

Difference between $\log(U(t+k))$ vs. $\log(\hat{U}(t+k))$



"Our extrapolator exhibits at least one order of magnitude lower absolute bias than the existing extrapolator for 4 out of 5 subjects, especially for long-term prediction."

 \Rightarrow Well-handled the adaptive bias

➡ Chao and Jost approach ➡ Our approach

(close to 1 is better) The average ratio $U(t + k)/\hat{U}(t + k)$: [Existing] **1.6 - 800** [Ours] **1.17 - 7** across all subjects.





Extrapolating Coverage Rate in Greybox Fuzzing

Danushka Liyanage* Monash University Australia

Chakkrit Tantithamthavorn Monash University Australia

ABSTRACT

A fuzzer can literally run forever. However, as more resources are spent, the coverage rate continuously drops, and the utility of the fuzzer declines. To tackle this coverage-resource tradeoff, we could introduce a policy to stop a campaign whenever the coverage rate drops below a certain threshold value, say 10 new branches covered per 15 minutes. During the campaign, can we predict the coverage rate at some point in the future? If so, how well can we predict the future coverage rate as the prediction horizon or the current campaign length increases? How can we tackle the statistical challenge of adaptive bias, which is inherent in greybox fuzzing (i.e., samples are not independent and identically distributed)?

In this paper, we i) evaluate existing statistical techniques to predict the coverage rate $U(t_0 + k)$ at any time t_0 in the campaign after a period of *k* units of time in the future and ii) develop a new extrapolation methodology that tackles the adaptive bias. We propose to efficiently simulate a large number of blackbox campaigns from the collected coverage data, estimate the coverage rate for each of these blackbox campaigns and conduct a simple regression to extrapolate the coverage rate for the greybox campaign.

Our empirical evaluation using the Fuzztastic fuzzer benchmark demonstrates that our extrapolation methodology exhibits at least one order of magnitude lower error compared to the existing benchmark for 4 out of 5 experimental subjects we investigated. Notably, compared to the existing extrapolation methodology, our extrapolator excels in making long-term predictions, such as those extending up to three times the length of the current campaign.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Software and its engineering → Software testing and debugging; • Security and privacy \rightarrow Software security engineering.

KEYWORDS

greybox fuzzing, extrapolation, coverage rate, adaptive bias, statistical method

*Both authors contributed equally to this research.



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Seongmin Lee* MPI-SP Germany

Marcel Böhme MPI-SP Germany

1 INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the millennium, the late Mary-Jean Harrold drew a research roadmap for the software testing community of the future [13]. She highlighted the "development of techniques and tools for use in estimating, predicting, and performing testing on evolving software systems" as one of five research pointers. While there has been some recent progress in the estimation of pertinent quantities in the testing process, we have yet to start exploring methodologies for prediction.

The rate at which new coverage is achieved is considered a fundamental measure of the efficiency of a fuzzing campaign. A fuzzer is an automated software testing tool, and with increasing coverage, we mean the generation of inputs that cover new program elements, such as a branch or a statement. If the coverage rate drops below a certain threshold, the tester will abort the ongoing fuzzing campaign for the lack of progress. Terminating a fuzzing campaign early will help release computational resources and reduce the carbon footprint [17, 26]. If, throughout the campaign, the tester could accurately predict the coverage rate at some point in the future, they could conduct a cost-benefit analysis to assess the resources required to achieve the targeted testing progress. Since fuzzing is a preliminary testing technique that constitutes sophisticated testing frameworks (e.g., a hybrid/ensemble fuzzing, an automated test case generation framework, etc.), such a prediction would allow the tester to adequately allocate resources (time and computing power) for the entire testing process in advance [29].


One of the most successful fuzzing techniques is called greybox fuzzing, which takes a mutation-based, coverage-guided approach. A greybox fuzzer is mutation-based because it uses a corpus of program inputs that are randomly mutated to slightly corrupt the seed file while preserving much of the unknown but required input format. A greybox fuzzer is *coverage-guided* because it adds generated inputs to the corpus that have been observed to increase coverage. The hope is that an input generated from a coverage-increasing input is itself more likely coverage-increasing. Since the probability of covering a specific program element changes in this process, the underlying distribution over these elements is not invariant. However, invariance is a key assumption in most statistical estimation and extrapolation methodologies. Hence, a key *statistical challenge* in the domain of greybox fuzzing is thus to tackle the resulting adaptive bias.

In this paper, we introduce a novel extrapolation methodology that allows us to predict the coverage rate $U(t_0 + mt_0)$ in a greybox campaign of length t_0 if the campaign length was extended *m* more times while accounting for adaptive bias. We systematically select **Extrapolating Coverage Rate in Greybox Fuzzing** Danushka Liyanage*, Seongmin Lee*, Chakkrit Tantithamthavorn, and Marcel Böhme. ICSE 2024.


Extrapolate the future progress of the greybox fuzzing by handling the adaptive bias through introducing a regression model over predictions on subcampaigns.



"There is always **unseen**."




"There is always **unseen**."





"There is always **unseen**."





"There is always **unseen**."




Check how the **statistical estimator** can measure the **unseen in software testing**.

Missing Mass

What is the **probability** of observing **a new coverage or a new bug**?

Extrapolation

How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?






"There is always **unseen**."

Solution:

Good-Turing estimator

Alan Turing






colors only seen once in samples

of *singleton colors


of samples

The estimation of the probability of our following sample is something that has <u>never been seen before</u>.






"There is always **unseen**."



Anne Chao and Robert K Colwell. 2017. Thirty years of progeny from Chao's inequality: Estimating and comparing richness with incidence data and incomplete sampling. SORT 41 Anne Chao and Lou Jost. 2012. Coverage-based rarefaction and extrapolation: standardizing samples by completeness rather than size. Ecology 93





"There is always **unseen**."




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
Extrapolation


How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?



Our Solution: <u>Structure-aware</u> Reachability Estimator

• Approach: reflect the *(control) dependence relation* between the program states.







"There is always **unseen**."




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
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
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
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
How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?








How can we assure the Quality of Software



Mathematical proof can provide a <u>formal guarantee</u>




Mathematical proof can provide a <u>formal guarantee</u>





Scalability issues on modern software




Mathematical proof can provide a <u>formal guarantee</u>






Scalability issues on modern software

Empirical Methods



Test software by running it with various test executions

By actually running the software, it solves the Ascalability issue




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
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
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


Test software by running it with various test executions

By actually running the software, it solves the Ascalability issue



There is always unseen ⇒ <u>No guarantee</u>




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Scalability issues on modern software

Empirical Methods



Test software by running it with various test executions

By actually running the software, it solves the 🔔 scalability issue



There is always unseen \Rightarrow **No quarantee**

Statistics can solve this!


















ML models are already widely used in SE research/practice.



ML models are already widely used in SE research/practice.

Magic of Statistics for Software Testing: How to Foresee the Unseen

The Fundamental Problem of Software Testing

"There is always **unseen**."

Questions about the unseen in an Urn filled with Balls

Species Richness

 $\frac{n-1}{n} \frac{(\Phi_1)^2}{2\Phi_2}$

Check how the **statistical estimator** can measure the **unseen in software testing**.

1

Missing Mass

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
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How much more can I achieve if I spend X more time here?







Dr. Seongmin Lee



https://nimgnoeseel.github.io/

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